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Debt Overhang, Rollover Risk, and Corporate Investment: Evidence from the European Crisis

机译:债务积压、展期风险和企业投资:来自欧洲危机的证据

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摘要

We quantify the role of financial leverage behind the sluggish post-crisis investment performance of European firms. We use a cross-country firm-bank matched database to identify separate roles for firm leverage, bank balance sheet weaknesses arising from sovereign risk, and aggregate demand conditions. We find that firms entering the crisis with higher debt levels reduce their investment more after the crisis. This negative effect is stronger for firms holding short-term debt in countries whose banks are weak due to sovereign stress, consistent with rollover risk being an important channel influencing investment. The negative effect of firm leverage on investment is also persistent for several years after the shock in the countries with sovereign stress. The corporate leverage channel can explain about 20 of the cumulative decline in aggregate private sector investment over the crisis period.
机译:我们量化财务杠杆的作用缓慢的危机后的投资业绩欧洲的公司。firm-bank匹配的数据库来识别分离角色公司杠杆,银行的资产负债表主权风险带来的缺点总需求条件。进入危机与更高的债务水平减少他们的投资更多在危机后。这对公司的负面影响更强在国家的银行持有短期债务弱是由于主权压力,符合吗展期风险是一个重要渠道影响投资。公司杠杆投资也是持久的多年后的冲击主权国家的压力。利用通道可以解释大约20%的私营部门总累计下跌投资在金融危机时期。

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