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首页> 外文期刊>Mathematical Problems in Engineering: Theory, Methods and Applications >Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts
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Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

机译：Profit Seeking versus Survival Seeking: Green Investment of Capital-Constrained Suppliers with Incentive Contracts

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摘要

This study explores a supply chain with a capital-constrained startup supplier who invests in product greenness and a manufacturer who sells green products to consumers under demand uncertainty. Green investment of the supplier is supported by the manufacturer with two incentive contracts: (i) investment- and (ii) revenue-sharing contracts. Profit- and survival-seeking objectives are considered for the startup supplier. Results show that the profit-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if demand uncertainty rises, whereas the survival-seeking supplier increases its product greenness if its capital constraints increase. Compared with the commonly used wholesale price contract, investment- and revenue-sharing contracts can help facilitate the "win-win" supply chain cooperation for improving product greenness. If the profit-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the investment-sharing contract is preferred as the demand uncertainty increases. If a survival-seeking supplier cooperates with the manufacturer, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred as the capital constraint increases. Overall, the revenue-sharing contract is preferred given the high attractiveness of the green investment. By extending the discussion into two periods, the revenue-sharing contract will be preferred in the survival-seeking case because the cooperation can continue in a large parameter space.

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    Xia Bing; Zhang Junling;

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    China Banking & Insurance Regulatory Commiss, Postdoctoral Sci Res Workstn, Beijing 100033, Peoples R China|Renmin Univ, Business Sch, Beijing 100872, Peoples R China;

    Tsinghua Univ, Sch Finance, Beijing 100083, Peoples R China;

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