Stability, Global Dynamics, and Social Welfare of a Two-Stage Game under RD Spillovers

Zhou Wei; Chu Tong; Wang Xiao-Xue

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Stability, Global Dynamics, and Social Welfare of a Two-Stage Game under RD Spillovers

机译：Stability, Global Dynamics, and Social Welfare of a Two-Stage Game under RD Spillovers

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In this paper, a repeated two-stage oligopoly game where two boundedly rational firms produce homogeneous product and apply gradient adjustment mechanism to decide their individual R&D investment is considered. Results concerning the equilibrium in the built model and the stability are discussed. The effects of system parameters on the complex dynamical behaviors of the built game are analyzed. We find that the system can lose stability through a flip bifurcation or a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation. In addition, the coexistence of multiattractors is also discussed using the so-called basin of attraction. At the end of this research, the social welfare of the given duopoly game is also studied.

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《Mathematical Problems in Engineering: Theory, Methods and Applications》 |2021年第2期|2096868.1-2096868.19|共19页
作者
Zhou Wei; Chu Tong; Wang Xiao-Xue;
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Lanzhou Jiaotong Univ, Sch Math & Phys, Lanzhou 730070, Gansu, Peoples R China|Lanzhou Jiaotong Univ, Res Ctr Game Theory & Econ Math, Lanzhou 730070, Gansu, Peoples R China;

Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Law, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China;

Lanzhou Jiaotong Univ, Res Ctr Game Theory & Econ Math, Lanzhou 730070, Gansu, Peoples R China;

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Stability, Global Dynamics, and Social Welfare of a Two-Stage Game under RD Spillovers

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