Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games

Chen Ling

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Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games

机译：Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games

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A direct proof of the envelope theorems and intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria (OLSE) is given using an extended primal-dual method. It is shown that the follower’s envelope and comparative dynamics results agree in form with those of any player in an open-loop Nash equilibrium, while those of the leader differ. This difference allows, in principle, an empirical test of the leader–follower role in a differential game. Separability conditions are identified on the instantaneous payoff and transition functions under which, for certain parameters, the intrinsic comparative dynamics of the leader’s time-inconsistent OSLE and those in the corresponding optimal control problem are qualitatively identical. However, similar conditions do not exist for time-consistent OSLE.

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来源
《International game theory review》 |2022年第4期|2250010.1-2250010.25|共25页
作者
Chen Ling;
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作者单位

School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, 18 Xueyuan Street, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310018,P. R. China;

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正文语种英语
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Comparative dynamics; open-loop Stackelberg equilibria; differential games;

Comparative Dynamics and Envelope Theorems of Open-Loop Stackelberg Equilibria in Differential Games

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