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>Externalities in the wildland–urban interface: Private decisions, collective action, and results from wildfire simulation models for California
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Externalities in the wildland–urban interface: Private decisions, collective action, and results from wildfire simulation models for California
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机译：Externalities in the wildland–urban interface: Private decisions, collective action, and results from wildfire simulation models for California
Property damage from wildfires occurs from spread into built-up areas, the wildland–urban interface. Fire spread occurs as embers from one burning structure igniteneighboring ones-but mitigation reduces the chances that fire spreads. In this study,we use a simulation model with realistic parameters for a neighborhood in Californiato illustrate patterns of marginal benefit from mitigation. We extend existing modelsof fire spread in two novel ways. We show how to describe the no-regulation equilibriumand social optimal levels of mitigation by incorporating data on a key factor, thedistribution of house values in the community. We incorporate insurance in the modeland show that it improves homeowner decision-making and insurance premium regulation.The fire spread simulations show that under plausible parameter values, thereis a pattern in which mitigation’s marginal benefit is low at low levels of communitymitigation, rises to a maximum, and then falls quickly to a low level. We argue that themaximum marginal benefit is a guide to achieving optimal mitigation in a community.Owner mitigation decisions will depend on the distribution of house values in the neighborhoodand other factors. In an illustration, we use the distribution of house valuesin a California community to illustrate the mitigation owners will choose under independent(Nash) investment decisions, and the efficiency-improving actions involvingregulations or insurance premium subsidies that can lead to the social optimum.
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