The U.S. Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence System (C3I) includes sensors (e.g., satellites and radars), communication links, and computer systems that allow gathering and processing of information that a missile attack on the continental United States may be on the way. The choice of a policy of response to such an attack depends in part on the reliability of the information coming from the C3I. We consider in this study four possible response policies: (1) launch on impact, (2) launch on attack assessment, (3) launch under attack, and (4) launch on warning. We propose a method to compute, for each policy, the probability of accidental nuclear strike and the probability of being unable to respond due to a malfunction of the C3I or to partial destruction of the response forces. We include in our system the launch authorization steps (permissive action links) and a very crude analysis of the survivability of second strike forces. We examine the variations of probabilities of Type I and Type II errors and the tradeoffs involved when shifting from a policy of launch on impact to another launch policy. We conclude that this simple but powerful method allows one to gain a good grasp on some of the complex issues involved.
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