Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

Galbiati Roberto; Henry Emeric; Jacquemet Nicolas

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Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

机译：Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

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In situations where social payoffs are not aligned with private incentives, enforcement with fines can be a way to sustain cooperation. In this paper we show, by the means of a laboratory experiment, that past fines can have an effect on current behavior even when no longer in force. We document two mechanisms: (i) Past fines affect directly individuals' future propensity to cooperate, and (ii) when fines for noncooperation are in place in the past, individuals experience higher levels of cooperation from partners and, consistent with indirect reciprocity motives, are in turn nicer toward others once these fines have been removed. This second mechanism is empirically prevalent and, in contrast with the first one, induces a snowball effect of past enforcement. Our results can inform the design of costly enforcement policies.

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《Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.》 |2018年第49期|12425-12428|共4页
作者
Galbiati Roberto; Henry Emeric; Jacquemet Nicolas;
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作者单位

Sci Po, CNRS, Dept Econ, F-75007 Paris, France;

Univ Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, Paris Sch Econ, Ctr Econ Sorbonne, F-75013 Paris, France;

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收录信息美国《科学引文索引》(SCI);美国《生物学医学文摘》(MEDLINE);美国《化学文摘》(CA);
原文格式 PDF
正文语种英语
中图分类自然科学总论;
关键词
prisoner's dilemma; experiment; institutional spillover; indirect reciprocity; cooperation;

Dynamic effects of enforcement on cooperation

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