...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>neuroscience of consciousness >What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena
【24h】

What it is like to be a bit: an integrated information decomposition account of emergent mental phenomena

机译：成为一点点是什么样子：对涌现心理现象的综合信息分解描述

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

A central question in neuroscience concerns the relationship between consciousness and its physical substrate. Here, we argue that a richer characterization of consciousness can be obtained by viewing it as constituted of distinct information-theoretic elements. In other words, we propose a shift from quantification of consciousness-viewed as integrated information-to its decomposition. Through this approach, termed Integrated Information Decomposition (Phi ID), we lay out a formal argument that whether the consciousness of a given system is an emergent phenomenon depends on its information-theoretic composition-providing a principled answer to the long-standing dispute on the relationship between consciousness and emergence. Furthermore, we show that two organisms may attain the same amount of integrated information, yet differ in their information-theoretic composition. Building on Phi ID's revised understanding of integrated information, termed Phi(R), we also introduce the notion of Phi(R)-ing ratio to quantify how efficiently an entity uses information for conscious processing. A combination of Phi(R) and Phi(R)-ing ratio may provide an important way to compare the neural basis of different aspects of consciousness. Decomposition of consciousness enables us to identify qualitatively different 'modes of consciousness', establishing a common space for mapping the phenomenology of different conscious states. We outline both theoretical and empirical avenues to carry out such mapping between phenomenology and information-theoretic modes, starting from a central feature of everyday consciousness: selfhood. Overall, Phi ID yields rich new ways to explore the relationship between information, consciousness, and its emergence from neural dynamics.
机译：神经科学的一个核心问题涉及意识与其物理基质之间的关系。在这里，我们认为，通过将意识视为由不同的信息论元素构成，可以获得更丰富的意识特征。換句話說，我們建議從意識的量化（視為整合信息）轉變為其分解。通过这种方法，称为综合信息分解（Phi ID），我们提出了一个正式的论点，即给定系统的意识是否是一种涌现现象取决于其信息理论构成，为意识与涌现之间关系的长期争议提供了一个原则性的答案。此外，我们表明，两种生物体可能获得相同数量的综合信息，但它们的信息理论组成不同。基于Phi ID对集成信息（称为Phi（R））的修订理解，我们还引入了Phi（R）-ing比率的概念，以量化实体使用信息进行有意识处理的效率。Phi（R）和Phi（R）-ing比率的组合可以提供一种重要的方法来比较意识不同方面的神经基础。意识的分解使我们能够识别定性的不同“意识模式”，为绘制不同意识状态的现象学建立了一个共同的空间。我们概述了理论和实证途径，以在现象学和信息理论模式之间进行这种映射，从日常意识的核心特征开始：自我。总体而言，Phi ID 为探索信息、意识及其从神经动力学中出现之间的关系提供了丰富的新方法。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号