Early in every new administration, the President and his nationalsecurity team are inundated with studies offering advice on how toorganize for national security. Many propose sweeping changes in thesize, structure, and mission of the National Security Council (NSC)staff, the fulcrum of national security decisionmaking. However attractivesuperficially, organizational tinkering is unlikely to drive betterperformance. This paper argues that structure and process are lessimportant than leadership and the quality of NSC staffing. No dutyrises higher than the President’s call to defend the Constitution andthe people and territory it nourishes. That duty will be tested early andoften. An NSC staff that is up to the task will play an enormous rolein keeping the United States safe.1 The NSC staff has four primary roles: to advise the President inthe field of national security affairs, to manage and coordinate theinteragency process in formulating national security policy, to broadlymonitor policy execution, and to staff the President for national securitymeetings, trips, and events. Many assume that the NSC staffdoes, or should do, much more. But it is first and foremost the President’spersonal national security staff.2 Other tasks—such as generatingindependent, whole of government national security policies andstrategies, or conducting detailed, daily implementation oversight—would require a much larger staff and inevitably lead to ponderous,centralized, and ultimately dysfunctional behaviors that would preventresponsive support to the President. Long-range “strategic” planningis surely essential, but more properly belongs to the interagency asa whole, vetted by the Deputies and Principals Committees and approvedby the full National Security Council. The NSC’s role as a process manager is not synonymous with policyadvocacy. While the National Security Advisor (NSA) may and oftenwill recommend a given course of action, a more critical function is ensuring that all viewpoints are heard and objectively assessed, andthat important issues are framed for decision. When allowed to becomean operational entity (as occurred during the Iran-Contra affair) or toeffectively preempt the Departments of State and Defense (as in theRichard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter eras), the NSC staffhas historically stumbled.3 Properly focused and chartered, the NSCstaff can empower and facilitate an interagency process that is otherwisecumbersome. Over time, the NSC staff has become immersed in policy detailand in responding to urgent or crisis events, fed largely by a 24-hournews cycle. This in turn creates pressure for staff growth. The result isa diminished ability to conduct high-level, far-seeing policy work at theappropriate strategic level. A smaller NSC staff by definition is unableto immerse itself in detailed policy oversight and micromanagement, acompelling argument for reductions in future administrations. In this regard, the NSC staff is not a line entity, statutorily empoweredto give orders in its own name. And significantly, it should notbe an interagency planning headquarters. It may forward Presidentialguidance and direction through formal channels or an approved interagencybody such as the Principals Committee. It cannot direct ordemand. However, the NSC staff and its head, the National SecurityAdvisor, enjoy two distinct advantages: access to the President, andthe ability to set the policy agenda in national security affairs. Usedjudiciously, these represent real power.
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