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首页> 美国政府科技报告 >On Behavior Strategy Solutions in Two-Person Zero-Sum Finite Extended Games with Imperfect Information. Part I. A Method for Determination of Minimally Complex Behavior Strategy Solutions
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On Behavior Strategy Solutions in Two-Person Zero-Sum Finite Extended Games with Imperfect Information. Part I. A Method for Determination of Minimally Complex Behavior Strategy Solutions

机译：不完全信息下两人零和有限扩展游戏的行为策略解。第一部分确定最小复杂行为策略解决方案的方法

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In any two-person zero-sum finite extended game with imperfect information, an upper bound on the quality of each player's strategies, is established by his choice of a scheme for gathering and retaining the information that becomes available to him as the game progresses. Further, for a given game, strategies of the maximum possible quality may exist for each player on a number of information schemes of widely differing complexities. By analyzing the relationship between any given two-person zero-sum finite extended game with given information schemes for its players, and an associated N-person non-cooperative game, a heuristic scheme is uncovered for searching for minimally complex information schemes which support behavior strategies having within epsilon of the maximum possible quality, for any given epsilon. (Author)

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