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首页> 美国政府科技报告 >Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Impirical Analysis of Army Officers' Tactical Expertise Over the 1990s
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Keeping the Warfighting Edge: An Impirical Analysis of Army Officers' Tactical Expertise Over the 1990s

机译：保持战争优势：20世纪90年代陆军军官战术专长的实证分析

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Due to high rates of deployments combined with other missions, some observers argue that today's smaller Army is becoming increasingly strained in terms of how much it can do while still maintaining unit training effectiveness and personnel readiness. Interviews conducted during RAND visits throughout 1998 and 1999 to most of the warfighting brigades in the United States indicated that some commanders anticipate an eventual degradation in the tactical competence of future leaders. This was attributed both to shorter tenure in key developmental positions and fewer opportunities within those assignments to participate in field training. Others viewed the pace as quick, but believed that their subordinates were being well prepared for future responsibilities. This dissertation conducted an empirical analysis to assess whether assignment length, tactical experience, and career patterns changed over the 1990s. The results presented here represent the project's report to sponsors from our empirical analysis of possible changes in the experience base of the current officer corps. This research was sponsored by U.S. Army Forces Command and the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and was conducted in the Arroyo Center's Manpower and Training Program. The Arroyo Center is a federally-funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

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