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Limits on defense in interactions between disparate forces

机译：不同力量之间相互作用的防御限制

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This note studies the sensitivity of strike incentives to defenses forinteractions between a strong side with defenses and a weak side with none using the exchange and cost models derived and discussed in a companion report and force levels derived for trilateral interaction with the small weak forces of greatest concern from a stability perspective discussed in an earlier paper. The conclusion is that the strong side can deploy modest defenses without loss of stability, if it strongly prefers the survival of its own high value targets and the weak side has some survivable weapons. The maximum number of defenses that can be deploy without exchange is largely determined by the weak side's survivable forces and the strong side's high value targets and preference for their survival. Allowable defenses could be increased by larger preferences for survival of high value, fewer high value targets, and more survivable weak force. The first act by making the strong side more reluctant to accept a given level of retaliation.

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