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Are Managers Indeed Motivated by Their Bonuses

机译:管理者是否确实受到奖金的激励

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摘要

The evidence in the paper corroborates an important behavioral assumption of principal-agent theory: that agents are (indeed) motivated by their bonuses. A 1984 data set is examined of 131 managers of the computer and electronics-industry in the Netherlands. The author finds that these managers are positively and significantly motivated by their bonuses, even after potentially confounding tax and signalling effects and the sensitivity of the manager's bonus for his effort are explicitly statistically controlled for. However, he also finds that the magnitude of work incentives from bonuses is small: on average these managers are induced to less than two additional hours of work per week by their bonus.

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