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Empirical Test of Holmstroem's Principal-Agent Model That Takes Tax and SignallyHypotheses Explicitly into Account

机译：Holmstroem主要代理模型的实证检验 - 以税收和信号假设为主线

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During the last two decades, economists have grown increasingly interested in thetheory of the firm. Much interest has focused on the economics of bonus schemes in a principal-agent setting. However, the empirical validity of this theory is not well established. A number of studies have documented evidence that is consistent with this theory. However this evidence is also consistent with tax and signalling hypotheses. The paper tests two hypotheses that are both derived from Holmstrom's 1979 'standard' principal-agent model: that a reciprocal relation exists between the agents' expected bonus and effort and that agents for whom performance variables are available with higher signal-to-noise ratios, earn higher bonuses associated with these variables. The agency hypotheses are tested against data about managers of high technology firms in the Netherlands. An empirical model is tested that takes simultaneously and separately into account effects suggested by tax and signalling hypotheses. The agency hypotheses are corroborated by the data.

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