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首页> 美国政府科技报告 >Implications of 'Zeroing' on Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Law. Economic Analysis Group
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Implications of 'Zeroing' on Enforcement of U.S. Antidumping Law. Economic Analysis Group

机译：“归零”对美国反倾销法实施的启示。经济分析小组

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The United States and other countries enforce their antidumping regulations in roughly the same way. There is a difference, however. The United States--but not other countries--now uses zeroing in its determination of whether imports are dumped. The use of zeroing will almost always increase the level of any antidumping duty, and will sometimes create a duty where none would have been imposed, had the methodology not been used. All countries test for dumping by attempting to determine whether imports are being sold at less than normal value. Other countries do this by simply comparing the average price at which the product is sold in the country of production with the average price at which the same product are sold in the importing market. If the average of the observed prices in the importing country is lower than the average price in the country of production (the normal value), then the foreign firm is said to be dumping. Using zeroing, however, the U.S. treats import price observations above the normal value as if they occurred at the normal value (rather than at their observed level). Transactions at prices below the normal value are treated at their observed levels. The result of zeroing has been to make the U.S. antidumping laws more restrictive than they might appear, with a positive antidumping margin potentially being found if any single transaction occurs below normal value, even if the average of the import prices in the U.S. is much higher than the normal value.

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