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首页> 美国政府科技报告 >Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking; Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings. FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper, No. 2008-07
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Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking; Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings. FDIC Center for Financial Research Working Paper, No. 2008-07

机译：存款保险和银行风险承担;内部贷款评级的证据。 FDIC金融研究中心工作文件，第2008-07号

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摘要

This paper analyzes the effect of deposit insurance on banks risk-taking in the context of a natural experiment using detailed credit registry data. We study the case of an emerging economy, Bolivia, that introduced a deposit insurance system during the sample period, and we compare banks risk-taking before and after the introduction of this system. We find that after the introduction of deposit insurance, banks are more likely to initiate riskier loans (i.e., loans with worse ratings at origination). These loans carry higher interest rates and are associated with worse ex-post performance. We also find that collateral requirements and loan maturities are not adjusted to compensate for the extra risk. Additional results suggest that the increase in risk-taking is due to a decrease in market discipline from large depositors. Our findings also suggest that differences in risk-taking between large (too-big-to- fail) and small banks diminished after deposit insurance.

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