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Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel.

机译：企业家道德风险与银行监管：信贷渠道模型。

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摘要

This paper develops a model of the choice between bank and market finance by entrepreneurial firms that differ in the value of their net worth. The monitoring associated with bank finance ameliorates a moral hazard problem between the entrepreneurs and their lenders. The model is used to analyze the different strands of the credit view of the transmission of monetary policy. In particular, we derive the empirical implications of a broad credit channel, and compare them to those obtained when the model is extended to incorporate some elements of the bank lending channel.

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作者
Repullo, R.; Suarez, J.;
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年度 1999
页码 1-26
总页数 26
原文格式 PDF
正文语种 eng
中图分类工业技术;
关键词
Businesses ; Banking ; Credit ; Monetary policy ; Entrepreneurs ; Loans ; Financial management ; Financing ; Interest rate ; Monitoring ; Marketing ; Economic models;

机译：企业;银行业;信贷;货币政策;企业家;贷款;财务管理;融资;利率;监控;市场营销;经济模型;

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专利

1. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel [J] . Rafael Repullo, Javier Suarez European Economic Review . 2000,第10期

机译：企业家道德风险和银行监管：信贷渠道的模型
2. Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit [J] . Greg Duffee Journal of Monetary Economics . 2009,第5期

机译：银行信贷由始至终分配模型中的道德风险和逆向选择
3. Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit [J] . Antje Berndt, Anurag Gupta Journal of Monetary Economics . 2009,第5期

机译：银行信贷由始至终分配模型中的道德风险和逆向选择
4. The Analysis of Credit Moral Hazard in Commercial Banks Based on Game Theory [C] . WANG Yajuan, WANG Xianjia Zhengzhou conference on management of technology;MOT 2009 . 2009

机译：基于博弈论的商业银行信用道德风险分析。
5. Credit risk, insurance and banking: A study of moral hazard and asymmetric information. [D] . Thompson, James R. 2008

机译：信用风险，保险和银行业务：道德风险和不对称信息的研究。
6. Sir Joseph Banks: eighteenth-century explorer botanist and entrepreneur [O] . Peter Jones 1981

机译：约瑟夫·班克斯爵士：十八世纪的探险家植物学家和企业家
7. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and bank monitoring: a model of the credit channel [O] . Rafael Repullo, Javier Suarez 100

机译：创业道德风险与银行监管：信贷渠道模型
8. Monitoring, Moral Hazard, and Market Power: A Model of Bank Lending [R] . Covitz, D., Heitfield, E. 1999

机译：监管，道德风险和市场力量：银行贷款模型

Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel.

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