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Is the effect of a political event more pronounced for government controlled firms?

机译：政治事件对政府控制公司更加宣称的政治事件的影响吗？

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This study investigates market reaction to a political event, which is the presidential election of Republic of Indonesia in 2014 by studying 387 publicly traded firms in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. It employs event study method to measure the information content of this event. By going deeper, this study looked at the effect difference between government controlled firms (partially privatized firms) and private firms. The results show that there was a significant abnormal return around the event date. The negative abnormal return one day before the election date, which was followed by rebounding one day after the event, indicate that investors consider that the election had been done well particularly with respect to the political stability and security. Moreover, this paper reveals that the effect of presidential election is more pronounced for government-controlled firms than private firms. Government controlled firms may be more susceptible to political event.

机译：本研究调查了对政治事件的市场反应，该事件是2014年印度尼西亚共和国共和国的总统选举在印度尼西亚证券交易所的387家公开交易公司。它采用事件研究方法来衡量此事件的信息内容。通过更深入地，这项研究看着政府控制公司（部分私有化公司）和私营公司之间的效果差异。结果表明，活动日期周围存在重大异常返回。选举日期前一天的负面异常返回，随后在活动后一天反弹，表明投资者认为选举已经很好地遵守政治稳定和安全。此外，本文揭示了总统选举对政府控制的公司比私营公司更为宣称。政府控制的公司可能更容易受到政治事件的影响。

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Irwan Trinugroho; Aurio Fajrin; Sutaryo Sutaryo;
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年度 2016
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正文语种 eng
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5. Internal control and governance in non-governmental organizations designed to provide accountability and deter, prevent and detect fraud and corruption. [D] . Morehead, William Alonzo. 2007

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6. To Prevent Pernicious Political Activities: The Hatch Act and Government Ethics [O] . Cynthia M.A. Geppert 2020

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Is the effect of a political event more pronounced for government controlled firms?

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