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Regulatory price performance, excess cost indexes and profitability:how effective is price cap regulation in the water industry?

机译：监管价格表现，超额成本指标和盈利能力：水行业的价格上限监管效果如何？

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In this study we apply an index number approach to allow for cross sectional comparisons of relative profitability, productivity and price performance of the regulated Water and Sewerage companies (WaSCs) in England and Wales during the years 1991-2008. In order to better analyse the impact of regulation on WaSC performance, we decompose actual economic profits into spatial multilateral Fisher productivity (TFP) index, the inverse of which is demonstrated to be a regulatory excess cost index that measures the deviation of a firm’s actual costs from benchmark costs, and a newly developed regulatory total price performance (TPP) index, which measures the excess of regulated revenues relative to benchmark costs. Increases (decreases) in regulatory price performance are indicative of the loosening (tightening) of price cap regulation. Moreover, we also show that the relationship between actual economic profitability, regulatory excess costs and regulatory price performance indices can be used to categorize regulatory price caps as “weak”, “powerful” or “catch-up promoting”. The results indicated that throughout the entire 1991-2008 period, price caps were never “powerful”, in the sense that they required less productive firms to immediately and fully catch-up to the most productive firm to regain economic profitability. More specifically, during the years 1991-2000 price caps were “weak” as prices were high enough for the firms to achieve economic profits despite their low productivity levels. However, after 2001 prices became “catch up promoting” as they required less productive companies to eliminate at least some excess costs in order to eliminate economic losses. Finally, we emphasize that as our results also clearly demonstrated a much closer alignment between allowed revenues and benchmark costs after 2001, Ofwat’s approach during this period was not only appropriate, but should also be continued in the 2009 price review.
机译：在这项研究中，我们采用指数法对1991-2008年期间英格兰和威尔士受监管的自来水和污水处理公司（WaSC）的相对获利能力，生产率和价格绩效进行横断面比较。为了更好地分析法规对WaSC绩效的影响，我们将实际的经济利润分解为空间多边费舍尔生产率（TFP）指数，事实证明，该指数的倒数是衡量企业实际成本偏差的监管超额成本指数。基准成本，以及新开发的监管总价格绩效（TPP）指数，该指标衡量的是相对于基准成本的监管收入的超额收入。监管价格绩效的提高（下降）表明价格上限监管的放松（收紧）。此外，我们还表明，实际经济利润率，监管超额成本和监管价格绩效指数之间的关系可以用来将监管价格上限分类为“弱”，“有力”或“追赶”。结果表明，在整个1991年至2008年期间，价格上限从来都不是“有力的”，从某种意义上讲，价格上限要求生产力较低的公司立即全面追赶生产力最高的公司以重新获得经济利润。更具体地说，在1991-2000年间，价格上限“微弱”，因为尽管生产力水平较低，但价格足以使企业获得经济利润。但是，在2001年之后，价格开始“追赶”，因为它们要求生产效率较低的公司消除至少一些超额成本以消除经济损失。最后，我们强调，由于我们的结果也清楚地表明了2001年以后允许的收入与基准成本之间的关系更加紧密，因此Ofwat在此期间的做法不仅是适当的，而且应该在2009年的价格审查中继续使用。

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