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Representation, Materiality and Decision Control - Essays on the Role of Board of Directors as an Intermediate Actor in Corporate Governance

机译：代表性，重要性和决策控制权-董事会在公司治理中作为中介角色的角色

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摘要

Board of directors has an independent and intermediate role in corporate governance. The role of board consists of two related but separate relationships, one towards shareholders and the other towards management. Shareholders delegate the majority of their powers to directors, and directors independently determine which decision rights they hold and which they further delegate to management. Boards have the challenging task of channeling a diverse collection of shareholder preferences into an organized decision-making structure that is capable of action. This dissertation consists of four essays that investigate the distinct role of the board. The general framework for all essays arises from a Principal-representative-delegate model of governance, which can be seen as a refinement of classical agency theory. In this model, shareholders are seen as principals, board as representatives of shareholders and management as delegates or agents of directors. Board determined decision rights are used as a lens throughout the dissertation to explore board relationships, first essay building the basis for subsequent empirical analysis by investigating the concept of materiality from ex ante decision-making perspective, rather than the ex post approach of audit and legal research. Second essay focuses on representation and accountability which define the relationship between board and shareholders, arguing that in closely held companies boards act as delegates, showing face-to-face accountability towards largest shareholders, while in widely held companies they act as trustees, using independent judgment and establishing their accountability through more extensive disclosure. The third essay analyzes the determinants of division of power between directors and management finding that board decision control is independent on ownership structures, directors effectively mitigating horizontal agency problems.  However, duality of CEO/Chairman roles reduces board powers, suggesting that traces of vertical problem still remain. The final essay investigates what happens to the role of the board in situations of financial distress, where creditor interests surpass those of shareholders, discussing the role of directors in controlling the potential moral hazard when most of the financial risk falls on creditors. The dissertation is the first study systematically investigating matters reserved to the board through collecting and analyzing board rules and decision thresholds as determined by directors in 600 largest European companies by market capitalization. This hand-picked material provides novel data for understanding board's role as the epicenter of corporate decision-making, and opens up new avenues for understanding what boards actually do by analyzing their influence on decision control.  Allocation of decision rights is crucial for governance process.  If they are set too low, boards become de-facto managements, while if they are set too high, boards fail to represent shareholder interests properly.
机译：董事会在公司治理中具有独立和中间的作用。董事会的角色由两个相关但独立的关系组成，一个关系到股东，另一个关系到管理层。股东将大部分权力委派给董事，而董事独立地决定他们所拥有的决定权以及将他们进一步委派给管理层的权力。董事会的艰巨任务是将多种多样的股东偏好引导到能够采取行动的有组织的决策结构中。本文由四篇论文组成，分别研究了董事会的独特作用。所有论文的总体框架都源于治理的委托-代表-代表模型，可以看作是对经典代理理论的完善。在此模型中，股东被视为委托人，董事会被视为股东的代表，管理层被视为董事的代表或代理。在整个论文中，董事会决定的决策权被用作探讨董事会关系的镜头，第一篇文章是从事前决策的角度研究实质性概念，而不是事后采用审计和法律的方法，从而为后续的实证分析奠定了基础。研究。第二篇文章着重于代表制和问责制，它们定义了董事会与股东之间的关系，认为在紧密控股的公司中，董事会充当代表，对大股东表现出面对面的问责制；而在广泛控股的公司中，董事会则充当董事，使用独立通过更广泛的披露来判断和建立其责任。第三篇文章分析了董事与管理层之间权力分配的决定因素，发现董事会决策控制独立于所有权结构，董事有效地缓解了横向代理问题。然而，首席执行官/董事长角色的双重性降低了董事会的权力，这表明仍然存在垂直问题的痕迹。最后的文章调查了在财务困境中，债权人的利益超过股东利益的情况下董事会的角色会发生什么，并讨论了当大多数财务风险落在债权人身上时董事在控制潜在道德风险中的作用。论文是通过收集和分析600家最大的欧洲公司的董事以市值确定的董事会规则和决策门槛，系统地调查保留给董事会的事项的第一篇论文。这些精选材料为理解董事会作为公司决策中心的角色提供了新颖的数据，并通过分析董事会对决策控制的影响，开辟了新的途径，以了解董事会的实际工作。决策权的分配对于治理过程至关重要。如果将它们设置得太低，则董事会将成为事实上的管理层；而如果将它们设置得太高，则董事会将无法正确代表股东利益。

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    Melgin Jari;

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  • 年度 2016
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