This report addresses specifically the verification of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty(FMCT). Although it is not clear what will be the scope of the Treaty, e. g. whether nuclearmaterials produced prior to entry into force will be included and to what extent, manyelements of the verification can be negotiated independently of the verification.The report starts with an overview of general principles underlying the verification. Animportant principle of verification is its credibility. Even in case of a very limited scope,the verification must create assurance that all nuclear materials produced after entry intoforce are being used for known and non-proscribed purposes. The other principle is nondiscrimination.All rights and obligations for verification must apply equally to all memberstates. During the negotiations, two questions will arise: firstly, whether the verificationobligations of the non-nuclear weapon states are already met by the NPT verification, andsecondly, how close the two verification systems will come. The verification tasks for bothtreaties are very similar and large differences in the verification systems would be interpretedas discrimination.The next chapter outlines which terms need to be defined more specifically. Several materialsand material categories must be distinguished, and in most cases, it is useful to applyalready existing IAEA definitions. Especially, it will be necessary to clarify what must beunderstood by the terms "production" or "fissile materials". Also the levels of assurancethat will be considered satisfactory must be defined. These definitions will have implicationson the intrusiveness of the verification.In the following chapter, the verification tasks at different facilities are illustrated. Duringthe negotiations, it will have to be decided not only which materials should be covered butalso which kinds of facilities with which verification activities must be included in thesetasks. Facilities that are discussed in more detail in this chapter are reprocessing facilities,uranium enrichment facilities, and nuclear reactors.The next chapter explains in some detail major methods of verification. Methods are welldeveloped because they are being used by the IAEA for the verification of the NPT. Theyinclude declarations on status, design information, and material accountancy; containmentand surveillance techniques, inspections, and methods for the detection of undeclaredactivities as are being implemented by the recent IAEA safeguards reform.Many variations of which facilities should be included in the verification and whichmeasures are considered appropriate are possible. In the following chapter, three scenarioswith varying intrusiveness are presented and discussed. The first scenario includes onlyfacilities capable of reprocessing and enrichment. The second scenario additionallyincludes nuclear reactors and all kinds of direct-use material. In this scenario, the clandestineproduction of spent fuel would be detected. Several categories of reactors are distinguishedaccording to their sensitivity. In the third scenario, also the verification of the productionof low enriched uranium would be included. The benefit would be the creation ofhigher assurance that clandestine production of highly enriched uranium would bedetected.In the next chapter, some special problems are being discussed: The FMCT verificationwill also take place in states possessing nuclear weapons who might wish to protect sensitiveinformation. Some of these states possess facilities that have never been subject to full-scope safeguards, and some of them might want to go on with the production of HEUfor military naval reactors which will cause additional problems for verification.Finally, it is recommended to task the IAEA with the verification.
展开▼
