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Judge or Bureaucrat? How Administrative Law Judges Exercise Discretion in Welfare Bureaucracies

机译：法官还是官僚？行政法法官如何在福利官僚机构中行使自由裁量权

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摘要

Administrative law judges are neglected but powerful actors in public welfare bureaucracies, presiding over quasi-judicial hearings triggered if participants challenge a bureaucratic decision on public welfare benefits. Drawing on ethnographic observations of fair hearings, as well as interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this study seeks to understand the ways in which these judges exercise discretion and how it affects the adjudication of disputes. Findings suggest that disputes generated by poorly run bureaucracies provide judges with limited opportunity to use professional skills or discretion to scrutinize bureaucratic practices. When opportunities for such judgments do arise, judges take widely divergent paths. Some align themselves with the welfare agency, enforcing bureaucratic practices rather than scrutinizing them. Others emphasize their neutrality and judicial role, scrutinizing and aligning agency practices with the law’s underlying purposes.
机译：行政法法官是公共福利官僚机构中被忽视但有影响力的参与者，主持着准司法听证会，如果参与者对官僚机构对公共福利的决定提出异议，则会引发此类诉讼。本研究利用人种学上对公正听证会的观察以及对行政法法官和上诉人的采访，试图了解这些法官行使自由裁量权的方式及其对争端裁决的影响。调查结果表明，官僚机构运作不善所引起的纠纷为法官提供了使用专业技能或酌处权审查官僚作风的机会。当出现这种判断的机会时，法官会采取截然不同的方法。有些人与福利机构保持一致，执行官僚作风而不是对其进行审查。其他人则强调他们的中立性和司法作用，根据法律的基本目的对代理机构的做法进行审查和调整。

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    Lens Vicki A.;

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  • 年度 2012
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  • 正文语种 {"code":"en","name":"English","id":9}
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