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The generalized Nash equilibrium model for oligopolistic transit market with elastic demand

机译：具有弹性需求的寡头公交市场的广义纳什均衡模型

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摘要

This paper presents a bilevel transit fare equilibrium model for a deregulated transit system. In the upper-level problem, the transit competition is portrayed as an n-player, non-cooperative game by changing the fare structure of each of a set of transit lines separately so as to maximize the profit of each transit operator within the oligopolistic market. We show that there exists a generalized Nash game between transit operators, which can be formulated as a quasi-variational inequality problem. In the lower-level problem, the passengers' response to the equilibrium fare structure of the transit operators is represented by the stochastic user equilibrium transit assignment model with elastic OD demand. As a result, the bilevel transit fare equilibrium problem is presented in the Stackelberg form and solved by a heuristic solution algorithm based on a sensitivity analysis approach. A numerical example is given to illustrate the competition mechanism on the transit network and some useful findings are presented on competitive operations.
机译：本文提出了放松管制的公交系统的双层公交票价均衡模型。在较高层次的问题中，通过分别更改一组公交线路中每条公交线路的票价结构，将公交竞争描绘成一种n玩家非合作游戏，从而在寡头市场中最大化每个公交运营商的利润。我们证明了公交运营商之间存在一个广义的纳什博弈，可以将其表达为准变分不等式问题。在下层问题中，乘客对过境运营商均衡票价结构的反应由具有弹性OD需求的随机用户均衡过境分配模型表示。结果，双层交通票价均衡问题以Stackelberg形式出现，并通过基于灵敏度分析方法的启发式求解算法解决。数值例子说明了公交网络上的竞争机制，并提出了一些有用的发现。

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  • 作者

    Zhou J; Lam WHK; Heydecker BG;

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  • 年度 2005
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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