The paper shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized\udby behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a\udpre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in\udtheir strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the population\udof identical firms in which some of them are profit maximizers while others follow\udan alternative criterion, turn out to be deviation-proof equilibria both in\udsimultaneous and sequential game structures. Our findings that in a strategic\udframework heterogeneous behavioral rules may be consistent with individual\udincentives is a first attempt to provide a game-theoretic microfoundation of\udheterogeneity.
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机译：本文表明，战略数量竞争可以通过行为异质性来表征，一旦竞争企业被允许进入市场前阶段以最优的方式选择他们将在其战略选择中遵循的行为规则。尤其是，相同公司的总体\ ud \ u \ u \ u \ u \ u下，其中一些是利润最大化者而其他\ u \ udand替代准则的分区，在\ u同时，顺序博弈结构中都证明是防偏差的均衡。我们的研究发现，在策略性\超框架中，异类的行为规则可能与个人\激励措施相一致，这是提供\异质性的博弈论微观基础的首次尝试。
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