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More about economic and non-economic determinants of (mutual) trust and trustworthiness

机译：更多关于（相互）信任和可信赖的经济和非经济决定因素

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摘要

The aim of this paper is threefold: we first discuss the appropriateness of the traditional trust-game-tree for the analysis of trust relationships. Following the definition put forward by Lee et al. (2005) that confident expectations and a willingness to be vulnerable are critical components of all definitions of trust, we relate these criteria to the subjective probabilities given by Coleman's inequality. Then, we develop the trust-tree-game further to a psychological trust game in the vein of Dufwenberg (2002). Here, we complement the concept of trust responsiveness with the idea of honouring trust responsiveness which enables us to consider the issue of mutuality in trustrelationships. In a second step, we move on to the concept of mutual trust (which is more than some degree of mutuality in a trust relationship), where each individual can be both trustor and trustee. This aspect is visualized within the two-person optimal intertemporal consumption choice model.The corresponding creditor-debtor-game reproduces the well known prisoner's dilemma. In a third step we analyse in depth how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related to trust and trust worthiness in (inter)national credit contracts. The fact that we observe multiple creditor-debtor-relationships in an economy seems to reflect not only the gains from cooperation in repeated games, but also the existence of generalized trust in the society.
机译：本文的目的是三个方面：我们首先讨论传统信任博弈树对信任关系分析的适用性。按照李等人提出的定义。 （2005年），自信的期望和脆弱的意愿是所有信任定义的关键组成部分，我们将这些标准与科尔曼不等式给出的主观概率联系起来。然后，我们将信任树博弈进一步发展为心理信任博弈（与Dufwenberg（2002）相似）。在这里，我们通过尊重信任响应性的概念来补充信任响应性的概念，这使我们能够考虑信任关系中的相互关系问题。在第二步中，我们继续进行相互信任的概念（这不仅仅是信任关系中的某种程度的相互关系），其中每个人都可以既是受托人又是受托人。在两个人的最佳跨期消费选择模型中可以直观地看到这一方面。相应的债权人－债务人博弈再现了众所周知的囚徒困境。在第三步中，我们深入分析了替代的跨期弹性如何与（国际）国家信用合同中的信任和信任价值相关。我们观察到一个经济体中存在多种债权债务关系，这一事实似乎不仅反映了重复博弈中合作的收益，而且反映了社会中普遍信任的存在。

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    Sell Friedrich L.;

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  • 年度 2007
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  • 正文语种 eng
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