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A Zidane clustering theorem: Why top players tend to play in one team and how the competitive balance can be restored

机译:齐达内聚类定理:为什么顶级球员倾向于在一支球队中发挥作用以及如何恢复竞争平衡

摘要

Empirical evidence suggests that top players often play together in one team. Based on the O-ring theory (Kremer 1993) a Zidane clustering theorem is derived. It is argued that the best midfielder is most efficiently allocated when combined with an ace striker, and vice versa. This implies that better teams can payer higher wages, because players are more valuable for better teams than for weaker teams. In equilibrium all teams are of homogenous quality, otherwise a reallocation would occur on the players market. Obviously, such a clustering effect negatively affects the competitive balance. It is shown that the clustering effect must be compensated by decreasing marginal revenue for sporting success in order to restore the competitive balance. This is certainly not the case in the UEFA Champions League where the prize money is exponentially increasing thus contributing significantly to the inherent monopolization in professional sports leagues.
机译:经验证据表明,顶尖球员经常在一个团队中一起比赛。基于O形圈理论(Kremer,1993年),得出了齐达内聚类定理。有人认为,最好的中场球员与王牌前锋结合使用时效率最高,反之亦然。这意味着更好的球队可以支付更高的工资,因为球员对更好的球队比对较弱的球队更有价值。在平衡状态下,所有球队的素质都相同,否则球员市场上将发生重新分配。显然,这种聚集效应会对竞争平衡产生负面影响。结果表明,集群效应必须通过减少体育成功的边际收益来补偿,以恢复竞争平衡。在欧洲冠军联赛中肯定不是这种情况,在欧洲冠军联赛中,奖金呈指数增长,从而极大地促进了职业体育联赛的固有垄断。

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    Vuf6pel Henning;

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  • 年度 2013
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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
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