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An Existence Result for Hierarchical Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg Games

机译:层次stackelberg v / s stackelberg博弈的存在性结果

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摘要

In Stackelberg v/s Stackelberg games a collection of leaders compete in aNash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash gameamongst the followers. The resulting equilibrium problems are plagued by thenonuniqueness of follower equilibria and nonconvexity of leader problemswhereby the problem of providing sufficient conditions for existence of globalor even local equilibria remains largely open. Indeed available existencestatements are restrictive and model specific. In this paper, we present whatis possibly the first general existence result for equilibria for this class ofgames. Importantly, we impose no single-valuedness assumption on theequilibrium of the follower-level game. Specifically, under the assumption thatthe objectives of the leaders admit a quasi-potential function, a concept weintroduce in this paper, the global and local minimizers of a suitably definedoptimization problem are shown to be the global and local equilibria of thegame. In effect existence of equilibria can be guaranteed by the solvability ofan optimization problem, which holds under mild and verifiable conditions. Wemotivate quasi- potential games through an application in communicationnetworks.
机译:在Stackelberg v / s Stackelberg游戏中,一群领导者在跟随另一个Nash游戏的均衡条件的情况下,在一个Nash游戏中竞争。随之而来的均衡问题受到追随者均衡性的非唯一性和领导者问题的非凸性的困扰,从而为全球化甚至局部均衡性的存在提供充分条件的问题在很大程度上仍未解决。确实,可用的存在陈述是限制性的并且是特定于模型的。在本文中,我们介绍了此类游戏的均衡可能的第一个普遍存在结果。重要的是,我们不对追随者水平博弈的均衡性施加任何单值假设。具体来说,在假设领导者的目标承认准电位函数的前提下,本文引入一个概念,适当定义的优化问题的全局和局部极小值显示为游戏的全局和局部均衡。实际上,均衡问题的存在可以通过在温和且可验证的条件下成立的优化问题的可解决性来保证。通过在通信网络中的应用来激励准潜在游戏。

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