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Prior Relationship, Information Leakage, and the Choice of MA Advisor

机译:先验关系,信息泄漏和并购顾问的选择

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This study examines the impact of prior bank-firm relationship and information leakage concern on the acquirers’ choice of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions. Using the sample including 856 merger deals announced during the period January 1995 to December 2004 that involved public U.S. firms, we show that the previous underwriting and M&A advisory relationships increase the likelihood of being chosen to advise a particular M&A deal. Large firms are found to avoid sharing the same banks with their product-market rivals, where strategically valuable information is at the risk of flowing to rivals through various services provided by the investment banks. We also find that M&A advisors are less likely to be chosen by the acquirers when the advisors previously represented the current targets in M&A deals. Taken together, our results suggest that informational frictions create a constraint on M&A advisory services competition.
机译:这项研究考察了先前的银行-公司关系和信息泄漏问题对并购中购并方选择财务顾问的影响。使用包括1995年1月至2004年12月期间宣布的涉及美国上市公司的856项合并交易的样本,我们表明以前的承销和并购咨询关系增加了被选择为某项并购交易提供建议的可能性。发现大型公司避免与产品市场的竞争对手共享同一家银行,因为具有战略价值的信息有通过投资银行提供的各种服务流向竞争对手的风险。我们还发现,当购并者以前代表并购交易中的当前目标时,并购者不太可能选择并购顾问。综上所述,我们的结果表明,信息摩擦对并购咨询服务竞争造成了限制。

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