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首页> 外文会议>2007 International Conference on Manufacturing amp; Service Operations Management (MSOM 2007) >Long-Term Contracts under the Threat of Supplier Default
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Long-Term Contracts under the Threat of Supplier Default

机译：供应商违约威胁下的长期合同

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Thus, the possibility of losing a supplier to failure may a§ect the decisions that a buyer makes, including the price and the length of contracts. Should a buyer pay more to avoid losing a supplier to bankruptcy, or should the buyer pay less because the supplier is risky? Should the buyer make a long-term commitment to the supplier, or should the Orm minimize the length of its exposure to a risky partner? Should buyers bear some of the risk of cost uncertainty by compensating suppliers in a dynamic manner? These are the conáicts we seek to capture, via an operationalized model of buyer-supplier relations under the threat of supplier failure. The motivation is the automotive industry, but the model is relevant to many scenarios: supply chains with members in Onancial distress, supply chains with start-ups prone to bankruptcy, etc. Based on the aforementioned examples from the automotive industry, we believe these types of relationships have several key characteristics:
机译：因此，使供应商失败的可能性可能会影响买方的决策，包括价格和合同期限。买方应该支付更多钱以避免供应商破产吗？还是应该因为供应商有风险而减少支付？买方应该对供应商做出长期承诺，还是Orm尽量减少与风险合作伙伴的接触时间？买方是否应该通过动态补偿供应商承担一些成本不确定性的风险？这些是我们试图通过在供应商失败的威胁下，通过买方与供应商关系的可操作模型来捕获的冲突。动机是汽车行业，但是该模型与许多场景相关：成员陷入困境的供应链，具有容易破产的初创企业的供应链等。基于汽车行业的上述示例，我们认为这些类型关系有几个关键特征：

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