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首页> 外文会议>2012 IEEE 5th International conference on management engineering amp; technology of statistics >Donation, Subsidy and Demand for Catastrophe Insurance
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Donation, Subsidy and Demand for Catastrophe Insurance

机译：巨灾保险的捐赠，补贴和需求

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摘要

Catastrophe Insurance,donation and government's fund constitute the general compensation system.To make the rescue work more efficiently,catastrophe insurer should make full of its advantages in financial reparation,while donors should weigh higher on victims' living circumstances and mental health.However,China's compensation systems mainly rely on donation and government aid.Fund raised by them is limited in satisfying all the victims,not to mention help them refresh.Comparative advantages of insurers,donors and government is in vague.This paper study the effect brought about by donation and government on catastrophe insurance demand,we conclude that the donation will crowd out individual demand for catastrophe insurance,which can be relieved by premium subsidy.From this perspective,we study the relationship between subsidy and donation premise that individuals purchase full insurance.
机译：巨灾保险，捐赠和政府资金构成了一般的赔偿制度。为了使救援工作更有效，巨灾保险公司应充分利用其在经济赔偿方面的优势，而捐助者应在受害人的生活状况和心理健康方面给予更大的重视。赔偿制度主要依靠捐赠和政府援助。他们筹集的资金有限，无法满足所有受害者的需要，更不用说帮助他们恢复活力了。保险人，捐赠人和政府的比较优势模糊不清。本文研究了捐赠带来的效果并结合政府对巨灾保险需求的分析，得出结论认为，捐赠会挤出个人对巨灾保险的需求，而这可以通过保费补贴来缓解。从这个角度出发，我们研究了个人购买全额保险的补贴与捐赠前提之间的关系。

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