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首页> 外文会议>IEEE International conference on management engineering technology of statistics >Donation, Subsidy and Demand for Catastrophe Insurance
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Donation, Subsidy and Demand for Catastrophe Insurance

机译：捐赠，补贴和对灾难保险的需求

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摘要

Catastrophe Insurance,donation and government's fund constitute the general compensation system.To make the rescue work more efficiently,catastrophe insurer should make full of its advantages in financial reparation,while donors should weigh higher on victims' living circumstances and mental health.However,China's compensation systems mainly rely on donation and government aid.Fund raised by them is limited in satisfying all the victims,not to mention help them refresh.Comparative advantages of insurers,donors and government is in vague.This paper study the effect brought about by donation and government on catastrophe insurance demand,we conclude that the donation will crowd out individual demand for catastrophe insurance,which can be relieved by premium subsidy.From this perspective,we study the relationship between subsidy and donation premise that individuals purchase full insurance.
机译：灾难保险，捐赠和政府基金构成了一般赔偿系统。要使救援工作更有效地，灾难保险公司应充分发挥其在金融赔偿中的优势，而捐助者应对受害者的生活环境和心理健康权重。但是，中国的薪酬制度主要依赖于捐赠和政府援助。他们提出的特惠于满足所有受害者的限制，更不用说帮助他们的保险公司，捐助者和政府的补充优势。本文研究捐赠所带来的效果和政府关于灾难保险需求，我们得出的结论是，捐赠将涌出个人对灾难保险的需求，这可以通过Premium补贴来缓解。从这个角度来看，我们研究个人购买全部保险的补贴和捐赠前提之间的关系。

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