首页> 外文会议>2019 56th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference >Attacking Split Manufacturing from a Deep Learning Perspective
【24h】

Attacking Split Manufacturing from a Deep Learning Perspective

机译:从深度学习的角度攻击拆分制造业

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

The notion of integrated circuit split manufacturing which delegates the front-end-of-line (FEOL) and back-end-of-line (BEOL) parts to different foundries, is to prevent overproduction, piracy of the intellectual property (IP), or targeted insertion of hardware Trojans by adversaries in the FEOL facility. In this work, we challenge the security promise of split manufacturing by formulating various layout-level placement and routing hints as vector- and image-based features. We construct a sophisticated deep neural network which can infer the missing BEOL connections with high accuracy. Compared with the publicly available network-flow attack [1], for the same set of ISCAS-85benchmarks, we achieve 1.21× accuracy when splitting on M1 and 1.12× accuracy when splitting on M3 with less than 1% running time.
机译:集成电路拆分制造的概念是将生产线的前端(FEOL)和生产线的后端(BEOL)委派给不同的代工厂,以防止知识产权的过度生产,盗版,或FEOL工具中的对手有针对性地插入硬件木马。在这项工作中,我们通过将各种布局级别的布局和工艺路线提示表示为基于矢量和图像的功能,来挑战拆分制造的安全性承诺。我们构建了一个复杂的深度神经网络,可以高精度地推断缺失的BEOL连接。与公开的网络流攻击[1]相比,对于同一组ISCAS-85基准,在运行时间不到1%的情况下,在M1上进行拆分时,精度达到1.21倍;在M3上进行拆分时,精度达到1.12倍。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号