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首页> 外文会议>8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages ATAL 2001, Aug 1-3, 2001, Seattle, WA, USA >Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions
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Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions

机译：反社会特工和维克瑞拍卖

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摘要

In recent years auctions have become more and more important in the field of multiagent systems as useful mechanisms for resource allocation and task assignment. In many cases the Vickrey (second-price sealed-bid) auction is used as a protocol that prescribes how the individual agents have to interact in order to come to an agreement. We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if "antisocial" agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisocial attitude for economic agents that makes reducing the profit of competitors their main goal besides maximizing their own profit is introduced. Under this novel condition, agents need to deviate from the dominant truth-telling strategy. This paper presents a strategy for bidders in repeated Vickrey auctions who are intending to inflict losses to fellow agents in order to be more successful, not in absolute measures, but relatively to the group of bidders. The strategy is evaluated in a simple task allocation scenario.
机译：近年来，拍卖在多代理系统领域中作为资源分配和任务分配的有用机制变得越来越重要。在许多情况下，Vickrey（第二价格密封竞标）拍卖被用作规约，规定了各个代理商必须如何互动才能达成协议。我们证明，尽管有“理论上的”代理人参与拍卖过程，但维克瑞拍卖尽管具有理论上的好处，还是不合适的。更具体地说，引入了一种对经济主体的反社会态度，这种态度使降低竞争者的利润成为他们的主要目标，同时又使自己的利润最大化。在这种新情况下，特工需要偏离占主导地位的事实陈述策略。本文为多次维克瑞（Vickrey）拍卖中的竞标者提供了一种策略，这些竞标者打算给同业代理人造成损失，以取得更大的成功，而不是绝对的手段，而是相对于竞标者群体。在简单的任务分配方案中评估该策略。

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