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Executive Promotion Incentives and Stock Crash

机译：高管人员激励措施和股票崩盘

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摘要

This paper empirically examines the impact of executive promotion incentive on the risk of company stock crash by using the data of 2005-2015 Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies. The results show that the incentives for executive promotion are positively related to the risk of stock collapse. When the degree of information asymmetry is higher, the positive correlation between the promotion incentives of the company executives and the risk of stock collapse will be more significant; when the company's operating performance is poor, the positive correlation between the company's executive promotion incentives and the stock crash risk will also be more significant. This paper not only enriches the research on the promotion incentives of executives, but also has certain implications for the research and governance of stock crash.
机译：本文使用2005-2015年沪深A股上市公司的数据，实证研究了高管人员激励对公司股票崩盘风险的影响。结果表明，高管人员晋升的动机与股票崩溃的风险正相关。信息不对称程度越高，公司高管人员的激励激励与股票崩盘风险之间的正相关关系就越大；当公司的经营业绩不佳时，公司高管晋升激励措施与股票崩盘风险之间的正相关性也将更加显着。本文不仅丰富了对高管人员激励机制的研究，而且对股票崩盘的研究和治理也有一定的启示。

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