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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Systems, Development and Self-Organization; 20021130-1201; Beijing(CN) >Modeling Incentive Effects of Managerial Compensations in China's State-owned Enterprises
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Modeling Incentive Effects of Managerial Compensations in China's State-owned Enterprises

机译：中国国有企业管理人员薪酬激励效应的建模

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摘要

The paper first sets up a model of the relationship between firm performance and managerial effort. Then, use the simplified form of the model, the paper analyzes incentive effects of fixed salary compensation, management responsibility system, annual salary system and stock-based compensation contracts. The former three basically cover China's main compensation mechanisms in China's state-owned enterprises since liberation. The last one is a new emerging managerial compensation in China. The paper suggests that, in order to survive and remain competitive in a market with fierce competition, firms must take into account long-run development and growth. However, the paper finds that, in this respect, none of the former three is suitable for China's state-owned enterprise managers. Secondly, management responsibility system and annual salary system always encourage, to different degrees, managerial short-termism and incur relatively high agency costs. Thirdly, incentive contracts with stocks and stock options is the one which suits China's state-owned enterprises better, since it may prevent managerial short-termism and induce the manager to work hard for long-term firm profit. The paper believes that we should introduce into state-owned enterprises internationally prevailing compensation mechanism, that is, stock and stock option compensation, to motivate the manager to work hard for long-run firm benefits, and thus reduce agency costs in China's SOEs
机译：本文首先建立了企业绩效与管理工作之间关系的模型。然后，使用模型的简化形式，分析了固定工资薪酬，管理责任制，年薪制度和基于股票的薪酬合同的激励效果。解放前，前三个基本涵盖了中国国有企业在中国的主要薪酬机制。最后一个是在中国出现的一种新兴的管理人员薪酬。该文件建议，为了在激烈竞争的市场中生存和保持竞争力，企业必须考虑长期发展和增长。但是，本文发现，在这方面，前三个都不适合中国的国有企业管理者。其次，管理责任制和年薪制总是在不同程度上鼓励管理短期主义，并产生相对较高的代理成本。第三，带有股票和股票期权的激励合同更适合中国的国有企业，因为它可以防止经理短期主义，并诱使经理为长期的公司利润而努力。本文认为，应该将国际通用的薪酬机制，即股票期权和股票期权薪酬机制引入国有企业，以激励管理者为长期的公司利益而努力，从而降低中国国有企业的代理成本。

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