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Moving horizon game theoretic approaches for control strategies in a military operation

机译：动视界博弈论在军事行动中的控制策略

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Dynamic game theory has received considerable attention as a possible technology for formulating control actions for agents in an extended complex enterprise that involves an adversary. Examples of such enterprises are very common in military operations, decentralized electric energy systems, and competitive manufacturing processes. Enterprises of this typed typically involve two teams of decision agents each with a different objective function and possibly with a different hierarchy of decision-making Because of the complexity of such systems, traditional solutions from dynamic game theory are computationally extremely difficult, if not impossible, to derive. We discuss a solution approach where at each step the control agents limit the computation of their actions to a short time horizon that may involve only the next few time steps. This moving horizon solution, although suboptimal in the global sense, is very useful in taking into account the possible near-term control actions of the adversary. We illustrate this solution methodology using an example of an air military operation that involves two opposing forces.
机译：动态博弈理论作为一种可能的技术，已成为涉及敌方的扩展复杂企业中制定代理控制动作的一种可能技术。在军事行动，分散式电能系统和竞争性制造过程中，这类企业的例子非常普遍。这种类型的企业通常需要两支决策代理团队，每支决策代理的目标功能不同，决策层次也可能不同。由于此类系统的复杂性，动态博弈论的传统解决方案在计算上非常困难，即使不是不可能，推导。我们讨论一种解决方法，其中控制代理在每个步骤都将其动作的计算限制在较短的时间范围内，而该时间范围可能仅涉及接下来的几个时间步骤。尽管在总体意义上说，这种动态视野解决方案不是最优的，但在考虑到对手可能采取的近期控制行动时非常有用。我们以涉及两个对立部队的空中军事行动为例来说明这种解决方案方法。

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