This paper utilizes a chronological case study of the People's Republic of China's past nuclear proliferation and the United States' response to such activity in order to assess the motives behind proliferation and the effectiveness of various responses. It premises that there are three roles for proliferating states to assume: seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and technology, proliferating/selling such technology, and attempting to restrain proliferation practices. In its history, the PRC has occupied all three roles, making it an ideal case study. This paper uses the following timeframe: China's acquisition of the bomb in the 1960s, China's proliferation and sales during the late 1970s and the 1980s, and China's emerging restraint in the 1990s, as measured by bilateral decisions and accession into nonproliferation regimes. Responses to nuclear proliferation rely on either incentives or disincentives; because the U.S. has responded or justified not responding with variations of both, analysis of different instruments' efficacy is possible. Based on evidence from the case of the PRC, this paper concludes that disincentives of military action are ineffective and strategically unwise, and the most effective policies appear to be economic incentives ('carrots') with stringent requirements and diplomatic enforcement, an approach that may be described as tough engagement. The carrots have given China the impetus to make nonproliferation efforts, while the requirements and their enforcement have steadily addressed setbacks and shortcomings in that progress.
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