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The Dynamic Game Analysis of National Student Loan Policy

机译：国家助学贷款政策的动态博弈分析

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摘要

The national student loan system has been promoted by the way of credit supporting in China since, 1999 because of the massive demands for higher education. During the process of promoting, difficulties appeared in the loan's "Granting" and "retrieving". In the hope of analyzing the key points and questing the loan policy's working status, this paper, combining with the new policy promoted in 2004, discussed the relationship between the bank and the students at the angle of dynamic game theory. And the conclusion reached as follows: the anticipated subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium can be reached by carrying out the new policy and relevant measures. The bank chooses to offer the loan while the student chooses to pay comply with the loan contract.
机译：自1999年以来，由于对高等教育的巨大需求，中国通过信贷支持的方式促进了全国学生贷款体系的发展。在推广过程中，贷款的“赠与”和“收回”出现了困难。为了分析关键点并质疑贷款政策的运行状况，本文结合2004年提出的新政策，从动态博弈的角度探讨了银行与学生之间的关系。得出的结论是：通过实施新的政策和相关措施，可以达到预期的子博弈完美纳什均衡。银行选择提供贷款，而学生选择偿还贷款合同。

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