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首页> 外文会议>International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems >Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects
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Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects

机译：推荐嵌入式提供点机制，用于公共项目的众筹

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摘要

Civic Crowdfunding is emerging as a popular means to mobilize funding from citizens for public projects. A popular mechanism deployed on civic crowdfunding platforms is the provision point mechanism, wherein, the total contributions must reach a predetermined threshold in order for the project to be provisioned (undertaken). Such a mechanism has multiple equilibria but unfortunately, in many of these, the project may not be funded even if it is highly valued among agents. Recent work has proposed mechanisms with refund bonuses where the project gets funded in equilibrium if its net value is higher than a threshold among the agents who are aware of the crowdfunding effort. In this paper, we go one significant step further: we formalize the notion of social desirability of a public project and propose mechanisms which use the idea of referrals to expand the pool of participants and achieve an equilibrium in which the project gets funded if its net value exceeds a threshold among all the agents who value the project. A key challenge in introducing referrals in civic crowdfunding settings is to ensure that incentivizing referrals does not dis-incentivize contributions. A referral mechanism introduced in conjunction with a civic crowdfunding mechanism must ensure that the project gets funded at equilibrium. We propose a class of mechanisms that achieve these and we call this new class of mechanisms Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms (REPPM). In REPPM, by referring others to contribute, an agent can reduce his/her equilibrium contribution, but only up to a bound such that the project is funded at equilibrium. We propose two variants of REPPM and both these mechanisms have the remarkable property that, at equilibrium, referral bonuses are offered but there is no need for actual payment of these bonuses. REPPM can increase in the number of projects that are funded on civic crowdfunding platforms.
机译：公民众筹是作为一种流行的手段，用于调动公民公共项目的资助。部署在公民人群挤出平台上的流行机制是提供点机制，其中，总贡献必须达到预定阈值，以便提供项目（进行）。这种机制具有多个均衡，但不幸的是，在许多这些中，即使代理商在经验中受到高度重视，该项目也可能不会被资助。最近的工作已经提出了退款奖金的机制，如果其净值高于了解众筹努力的代理人的净值高于阈值，则该项目得到均衡。在本文中，我们进一步走了一步：我们正规化公共项目的社会可取性的概念，并提出了使用推荐的理念来扩大参与者池并实现该项目的均衡，其中项目提供资金的均衡值超过项目的所有代理商超过阈值。在公民众筹案环境中引入推荐时的一个关键挑战是确保激励推荐不提供贡献。与公民人民币筹集机制结合引入的推荐机制必须确保该项目在均衡中得到资金。我们提出了一类达到这些机制，我们称之为这类新的机制推荐嵌入的提供点机制（REPPM）。在REPPM中，通过提到其他人来贡献，代理人可以减少他/她的均衡贡献，但只能达到一个限制，这样该项目被均衡资助。我们提出了两种reppm的变种，这两个机制都具有非凡的财产，即在均衡，提供推荐奖金，但无需实际支付这些奖金。 reppm可以增加资助公民人群挤出平台的项目数量。

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