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The Prisoner's Dilemma and Countermeasures of Tacit Knowledge Sharing in University Research Team——Based on the Perspective of Behavioral Economics

机译：高校科研团队中囚犯的困境与隐性知识共享的对策-基于行为经济学的视角

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摘要

Under the individual rationality constraint, the tacit knowledge sharing of university research team is a kind of prisoner’s dilemma. Through the introduction of two kinds of preferences in behavioral economics: reciprocity preference and difference aversion preference, this paper constructed the conceptual model of tacit knowledge sharing in university research team based on behavioral economics. And we defined the different meanings of the two preferences in university research team, which was on the basis of previous research, as well as analyzed the improved prisoner’s dilemma of tacit knowledge in university research team based on difference aversion tendency. Finally, we gave the corresponding countermeasures from angles of changing members’ preference in university research team and implicit contracts.
机译：在个人理性的约束下，大学研究团队的隐性知识共享是一种囚徒的困境。通过引入行为经济学中的两种偏好：互惠偏好和差异厌恶偏好，构建了基于行为经济学的大学研究团队隐性知识共享的概念模型。并且，我们在先前研究的基础上，定义了大学研究团队中这两种偏好的不同含义，并基于差异厌恶倾向，分析了大学研究团队中隐性知识的囚徒困境的改善。最后，从改变大学研究团队成员的偏好和隐性合同的角度，提出了相应的对策。

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