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Dual game in state-owned enterprise property right evolution in China

机译:中国国有企业产权演变中的双重博弈

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摘要

The privatization reform of state-owned companies has been drawing much attention in the past 30-odd years of reform and opening-up. Based on the complete information dynamic game theory, the present paper introduces three factors to the decision-making function, namely, the knowledge of institution, the acceptability of ideology, and the pressure of unemployment. It attempts to explain the whole course of state-owned companies' property right evolution with endogenous mechanism, and advances that the property right reform of the state-owned enterprise would have an optimistic prospect of all-privatized situation.
机译:在过去的三十多年的改革开放中,国有企业的私有化改革一直备受关注。基于完全信息动态博弈理论,本文介绍了决策功能的三个因素,即制度知识,意识形态的可接受性和失业压力。试图用内生机制来解释国有企业产权发展的全过程,并提出国有企业产权改革将具有全民私有化的乐观前景。

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