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Modeling Government Intervention in Agricultural Commodity Markets: U.S. Dairy Policy Under the Agricultural Act of 2014

机译:模拟政府对农产品市场的干预:根据2014年农业法的美国乳制品政策

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The U.S. Agricultural Act of 2014 creates a new "margin insurance" program under which dairy farmers can receive indemnity payments from the U.S. government if a margin (defined as the difference between milk prices paid to farmers and an index of feed costs) falls below the insured level. The design of this Margin Protection Program (MPP) suggests that it has the potential to substantially weaken feedback processes that would adjust milk production, prices and margins if margins fall below program threshold levels, especially if the proportion of milk covered by insurance is large. This paper describes potential impacts of the MPP using a CLD, then uses an empirical SD commodity model for the U.S. dairy industry based on the commodity model described in Sterman (2000) to assess the impacts quantitatively. We compare the results of a Baseline scenario representing status quo dairy policies to outcomes under implementation of the new MPP during 2015 to 2018. Our analyses indicate that if margins fall to levels that activate indemnity payments, weakened feedback processes are likely to result in persistent lower margins, lower farm incomes and larger government expenditures than the continuation of current policies. We also evaluate impacts under alternative assumptions about feed and dairy market conditions, the date of the annual deadline for participation decisions and the extent of farmer participation (proportion of milk covered by the MPP). Stochastic simulations indicate that lower margins, decreased farm incomes and higher government expenditures are highly probable during 2015 to 2018, but that the differences with status quo policies are smaller with lower feed prices or higher demand for dairy products, when participation decisions are required earlier, and when aggregate farmer participation (proportion of milk covered) is less. These results imply that assessments of producer decision strategies based on historical data that do not account for program impacts may be misleading, and that participation decisions by individual producers may need to consider the aggregated market effects of collective producer decision making.
机译:2014年《美国农业法》创建了一个新的“保证金保险”计划,根据该计划,如果保证金(定义为支付给农民的牛奶价格与饲料成本指数之间的差额)低于规定的水平,则奶农可以从美国政府获得赔偿金。保险水平。此保证金保护计划(MPP)的设计表明,如果利润率低于计划阈值水平,尤其是如果保险所涵盖的牛奶比例很大,则其可能会大大削弱反馈流程,从而调整牛奶产量,价格和利润率。本文描述了使用CLD的MPP的潜在影响,然后基于Sterman(2000)中描述的商品模型对美国乳业使用经验SD商品模型来定量评估影响。我们将代表现状乳制品政策的基准情景的结果与2015年至2018年实施新MPP的结果进行了比较。我们的分析表明,如果利润率降至激活弥偿金的水平,则反馈过程减弱可能会导致持续降低利润,较低的农场收入和更大的政府支出,而不是现行政策的延续。我们还根据饲料和奶制品市场状况的其他假设,参与决策的年度截止日期以及农民参与的程度(MPP涵盖的牛奶比例)评估影响。随机模拟表明,在2015年至2018年期间,很有可能出现利润降低,农场收入减少和政府支出增加的趋势,但是当饲料价格较低或对乳制品的需求较高时,需要提前做出参与决策的情况,与现状政策的差异就较小,当农民的总参与量(含牛奶的比例)减少时。这些结果表明,基于历史数据的生产者决策策略评估没有考虑计划的影响,可能会产生误导,并且单个生产者的参与决策可能需要考虑集体生产者决策的总体市场影响。

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