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首页> 外文会议>International Carnahan Conference on Security Technology >Securing software cryptographic primitives for embedded systems against side channel attacks
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Securing software cryptographic primitives for embedded systems against side channel attacks

机译：保护嵌入式系统的软件加密原语，以防旁道攻击

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摘要

Side Channel Attacks (SCA) exploit information leakage from the physical implementation of a cryptographic primitive to recover secret values. Such attacks are a practical threat against embedded and cyber-physical systems physically exposed to malicious adversaries, and have been proven strong enough to breach a good deal of commercial grade systems. Given the wide diffusion of such devices, a systematic approach to the development of secure implementation of cryptographic primitives is necessary. In this paper, we provide an introduction to side channel attacks, and report a practical and automated security metric to capture the vulnerability of such software implementations to passive SCAs. A set of tools to compute the security metric and instantiate countermeasures is also described, together with a practical experimental validation of the effectiveness of such countermeasures.
机译：旁道攻击（SCA）利用从加密原语的物理实现中泄漏的信息来恢复秘密值。这种攻击是对物理上暴露于恶意攻击者的嵌入式和网络物理系统的实际威胁，并且事实证明，这种攻击足以破坏许多商业级系统。鉴于此类设备的广泛普及，必须有一种系统的方法来开发安全的加密原语。在本文中，我们提供了对边信道攻击的介绍，并报告了一种实用的自动化安全度量标准，以捕获此类软件实现对被动SCA的脆弱性。还介绍了一套计算安全度量和实例化对策的工具，以及对此类对策有效性的实际实验验证。

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