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Verification Lessons Learned from the INF, START Ⅰ and New START Treaties

机译:从INF,STARTⅠ和新的START条约中学到的验证课程

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A great deal of useful experience, most of it successful, has been acquired from 25 years of monitoring the INF, START Ⅰ and New START Treaties.' The tools used have included National Technical Means, massive data exchanges and notifications, more than 2,000 on-site inspections, perimeter and portal continuous monitoring, telemetry exploitation, unique identifiers and the use of implementation bodies. Analysis of this experience shows what we already know how to do well and also reveals where we have little experience or there are unsolved problems in dealing with possible future, more ambitious agreements. Experience under START Ⅰ, plus the much more open and cooperative current relationship between the U.S. and Russia, enabled the sides to devise a verification regime for New START that is "simplified and less costly" than previous regimes. It could be characterized as less access but more information, and implementation is going very well. We are very good at counting deployed missiles, missile launchers, bombers and their armament. We can also be confident in our ability to devise effective measures for eliminating missiles, missile launchers and bombers. We understand the training and techniques needed for effective inspections, as well as the subtleties of "managed access." Future agreements to very low levels raise a number of well-known, but unsolved verification problems. Chief among these are the monitoring of non-deployed warheads and their verifiable elimination, and challenge inspections, which are likely to be key requirements of these future agreements. Distinguishing between nuclear and conventional systems will probably be important and the START experience has some relevance to this. There may be difficult issues related to residual capabilities-"virtual deterrence." These considerations also apply to a possible Middle East WMD-Free Zone. Finding solutions to all these issues may be easier in the laboratory than at the negotiating table, but a strong base has been established and should be used.
机译:通过监测INF,STARTⅠ和新START条约的25年,已经获得了许多有用的经验,其中大部分是成功的。所使用的工具包括国家技术手段,大量数据交换和通知,2,000多次现场检查,周界和门户连续监控,遥测开发,唯一标识符以及执行机构的使用。对这些经验的分析显示了我们已经知道如何做得好,并且还揭示了我们在处理可能的未来,更雄心勃勃的协议方面经验不足或存在未解决的问题。 《第一阶段裁武条约》的经验,加上美俄之间更加开放和合作的当前关系,使双方能够为新的《第二阶段裁武条约》设计一种比以前的制度“简化且成本更低”的核查制度。它的特点是访问较少,但信息更多,并且实施进展顺利。我们非常擅长统计已部署的导弹,导弹发射器,轰炸机及其武器。我们也有能力制定出消除导弹,导弹发射器和轰炸机的有效措施的信心。我们了解有效检查所需的培训和技术,以及“管理访问”的精妙之处。未来的协议以极低的水平提出了许多众所周知但尚未解决的验证问题。其中最主要的是对未部署弹头的监视及其可核查的消除以及挑战检查,这很可能是这些未来协议的关键要求。区分核系统和常规系统可能很重要,START经验与此相关。可能存在与剩余功能有关的难题-“虚拟威慑”。这些考虑因素也适用于可能的中东无WMD区域。在实验室中寻找所有这些问题的解决方案可能比在谈判桌上更容易,但是已经建立了坚实的基础并且应该使用它。

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