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首页> 外文会议>International conference on decision and game theory for security >To Trust or Not: A Security Signaling Game Between Service Provider and Client
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To Trust or Not: A Security Signaling Game Between Service Provider and Client

机译：信任与否：服务提供商与客户之间的安全信号游戏

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摘要

In this paper, we investigate the interactions between a service provider (SP) and a client, where the client does not have complete information about the security conditions of the service provider. The environment includes several resources of the service provider, a client who sends requests to the service provider, and the signal generated by the service provider and delivered to the client. By taking into account potential attacks on the service provider, we develop an extended signaling game model, where the prior probability of the signaling game is determined by the outcome of a normal form game between an attacker and the service provider as a defender. Our results show different equilibria of the game as well as conditions under which these equilibria can take place. This will eventually help the defender to select the best defense mechanism against potential attacks, given his knowledge about the type of the attacker.
机译：在本文中，我们调查了服务提供商（SP）与客户端之间的交互，其中客户端没有有关服务提供商安全条件的完整信息。该环境包括服务提供商的多个资源，向服务提供商发送请求的客户端以及服务提供商生成并传递给客户端的信号。通过考虑对服务提供商的潜在攻击，我们开发了扩展的信号博弈模型，其中，信号博弈的先验概率由攻击者与作为防御者的服务提供商之间的正常形式博弈的结果确定。我们的结果显示了游戏的不同平衡以及可以发生这些平衡的条件。鉴于他对攻击者类型的了解，这最终将帮助防御者选择最佳的防御机制，以应对潜在的攻击。

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