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A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH FOR TEXTILE MANUFACTURER-BUYER RELATION UNDER QUALITY INSPECTION AND TRACEABILITY REGIME

机译:基于质量检查和可追溯性制度的纺织品制造商与买方关系的博弈论方法

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This paper studies the textile manufacturer-buyer relationship under quality inspection and traceability policy using non-cooperative Stackelberg game models. These models consider constant demand and price function, whereas the manufacturer and buyer regulate their profits by controlling product quality, transfer payment, quality inspection and traceability.
机译:本文使用非合作Stackelberg博弈模型研究了质量检验和追溯策略下的纺织品制造商与买方的关系。这些模型考虑了恒定的需求和价格函数,而制造商和购买者则通过控制产品质量,转移付款,质量检查和可追溯性来调节利润。

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