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Covert or not Covert: National Strategies During Cyber Conflict

机译：秘密与否：网络冲突期间的国家策略

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Anonymity is considered to be a key characteristic of cyber conflict. Indeed, existing accounts in the literature focus on the advantages of the non-disclosure of cyber attacks. Such focus inspires the expectation that countries would opt to maintain covertness. This hypothesis is rejected in an empirical investigation we conducted on victims' strategies during cyber conflict: in numerous cases, victim states choose to publicly reveal the fact that they had been attacked. These counterintuitive findings are important empirically, but even more so theoretically. They motivate an investigation into the decision to forsake covertness. What does actually motivate states to move into the international arena and publicly expose a cyber attack? The goal of this paper is to understand why and under which geopolitical circumstances countries choose to give up the advantages of anonymity. Whether they wish to Name and Shame opponents for ignoring international norms or whether they try to avoid public humiliation, victims of cyber attacks occasionally reveal the fact that they had been attacked. There is tension between such motivations and the will to protect intelligence sources and the incentives to prevent escalation if an attack is revealed, even more so if the attacker is exposed. Indeed, we find that sunk costs, counter-escalation risks and the need to signal resolve-while critical in motivating victims to keep cyber attacks secret-may not suffice under such specific circumstances. By focusing on the victim's side, we draw inspiration from data on real-world cyber attacks in order to place cyber operations in the larger context of secrecy and covert actions in the international arena. In so doing, the aim is to advance the use of empirical data for understanding the dynamics of cyber conflict and the decision-making process of states operating in this increasingly complex domain.
机译：匿名被认为是网络冲突的关键特征。确实，文献中的现有记载集中在不公开网络攻击的优势上。这种关注激发了人们期望选择保持秘密的期望。我们在网络冲突期间对受害者的策略进行的一项实证研究中驳斥了这一假设：在许多情况下，受害国选择公开披露遭受攻击的事实。这些违反直觉的发现在经验上很重要，但在理论上更重要。他们促使人们对放弃秘密的决定进行调查。是什么实际上促使各国进入国际舞台并公开暴露网络攻击？本文的目的是了解为什么国家选择在何种地缘政治条件下放弃匿名的优势。网络攻击的受害者无论是希望因无视国际准则而给对手起名并羞辱他们，还是想避免公开羞辱，网络攻击的受害者有时都会揭示出他们遭到攻击的事实。如果发现攻击，则这种动机与保护情报资源的意愿和防止升级的动机之间存在紧张关系，如果攻击者暴露在外，则动机之间也存在紧张关系。的确，我们发现沉没成本，反升级风险和发出解决信号的必要性虽然在激励受害者保持网络攻击的机密性方面至关重要，但在这种特定情况下可能不足以满足。通过关注受害者这一方面，我们从现实世界网络攻击的数据中汲取了灵感，以便将网络运营置于国际舞台上更大范围的保密和秘密行动的背景下。这样做的目的是促进使用经验数据来理解网络冲突的动态以及在这个日益复杂的领域中运营的国家的决策过程。

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