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首页> 外文会议>International conference on computer design >PUF-RLA: A PUF-Based Reliable and Lightweight Authentication Protocol Employing Binary String Shuffling
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PUF-RLA: A PUF-Based Reliable and Lightweight Authentication Protocol Employing Binary String Shuffling

机译：PUF-RLA：基于PUF的可靠和轻量级身份验证协议，采用二进制字符串改组

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Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) can be employed for device identification, authentication, secret key storage, and other security tasks. However, PUFs are susceptible to modeling attacks if a number of PUFs' challenge-response pairs (CRPs) are exposed to the adversary. Furthermore, many of the embedded devices requiring authentication have stringent resource constraints and thus require a lightweight authentication mechanism. We propose PUF-RLA, a PUF-based lightweight, highly reliable authentication scheme employing binary string shuffling. The proposed scheme enhances the reliability of PUF as well as alleviates the resource constraints by employing error correction in the server instead of the device without compromising the security. The proposed PUF-RLA is robust against brute force, replay, and modeling attacks. In PUF-RLA, we introduce an inexpensive yet secure stream authentication scheme inside the device which authenticates the server before the underlying PUF can be invoked. This prevents an adversary from brute forcing the device's PUF to acquire CRPs essentially locking out the device from unauthorized model generation. Additionally, we also introduce a lightweight CRP obfuscation mechanism involving XOR and shuffle operations. Results and security analysis verify that the PUF-RLA is secure against brute force, replay, and modeling attacks, and provides 99% reliable authentication. In addition, PUF-RLA provides a reduction of 63% and 74% for look-up tables (LUTs) and register count, respectively, in FPGA compared to a recently proposed approach while providing additional authentication advantages.
机译：物理上不可克隆的功能（PUF）可用于设备标识，身份验证，秘密密钥存储和其他安全任务。但是，如果许多PUF的质询-响应对（CRP）暴露给对手，则PUF容易受到建模攻击的影响。此外，许多需要认证的嵌入式设备具有严格的资源限制，因此需要轻量级的认证机制。我们提出PUF-RLA，这是一种使用二进制字符串混洗的基于PUF的轻量级，高度可靠的身份验证方案。所提出的方案通过在服务器而不是设备中采用纠错来提高PUF的可靠性并减轻资源约束，而不会损害安全性。提出的PUF-RLA具有强大的抵御暴力，重播和建模攻击的能力。在PUF-RLA中，我们在设备内部引入了一种廉价而安全的流身份验证方案，该方案在可以调用基础PUF之前对服务器进行身份验证。这样可以防止对手强行强迫设备的PUF获取CRP，从而将设备锁定在未经授权的模型生成范围之外。此外，我们还引入了涉及XOR和随机操作的轻量级CRP模糊处理机制。结果和安全性分析验证了PUF-RLA在暴力破解，重播和建模攻击方面是安全的，并提供了99％的可靠身份验证。此外，与最近提出的方法相比，PUF-RLA在FPGA中的查找表（LUT）和寄存器计数分别减少了63％和74％，同时还提供了更多的身份验证优势。

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