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Management of Individual Financial Risk

机译:管理个人财务风险

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This paper discusses the management of credit markets with imperfect information which leads to financial risk,and then I observe that: access to credit is especially restricted for the poor,owing to their inability to provide collateral.Collateral reduces both default risk and lender exposure in the event of default.Finally,I analyze the “Credit Rationing System”.As for policy implications,macroeconomic stabilization policies often ignore the consequences of raising interest rates on default risks in times of financial crises.Accordingly they may be ineffective or even counterproductive in attracting investors and restoring financial stability.The models also illustrate the possible perils of large infusions of subsidized credit by the public sector.
机译:本文讨论了具有不完美信息的信贷市场管理,导致财务风险,然后我观察到穷人的信贷尤其限制,因为无法提供抵押品.Collat​​eLal降低默认风险和贷款人暴露违约事件。最后,我分析了“信用配给系统”。为了政策影响,宏观经济稳定政策通常忽视在金融危机时期对违约风险提高利率的后果。因此,他们可能是无效的甚至对抗造成的吸引投资者并恢复金融稳定性。该模型还说明了公共部门对补贴信贷的大量投入情况的可能危险。

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