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Market valuation and earnings manipulation

机译：市场估值和收益操纵

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This paper examines a popular belief that managers of high valuation companies have a stronger incentive to manipulate future earnings than low valuation companies. Using U.S. data from 1988 to 2004 as our sample, we find the belief only half true. A positive relationship between valuation and future discretionary accruals only exists for companies receiving limited attention. For companies included in the Standard & Poor’s 1500 index, there is no such a relationship. As for the motivation of manipulation, the evidence suggests that it is used to increase the proceeds received from seasoned equity offerings; it is not used to facilitate executives to sell their personal stocks. Also, we do not find any evidence to support the claim that high valuation companies with a stronger equity-based compensation will manipulate more. On the contrary, there is weak evidence that high valuation companies with good governance will be less aggressive in using accruals.
机译：本文考察了一种普遍的看法，即高估值公司的经理人比低估值公司的经理人有更大的动机操纵未来收益。使用1988年至2004年的美国数据作为样本，我们发现这一信念只有一半是正确的。估值与未来可任意计提收益之间的正相关关系仅存在于受到关注较少的公司中。对于被列入标准普尔1500指数的公司而言，没有这种关系。至于操纵的动机，有证据表明，它被用来增加从经验丰富的股票发行中获得的收益。它不用于促进高管出售他们的个人股票。此外，我们找不到任何证据支持声称拥有较高股权补偿的高估值公司会操纵更多股票的证据。相反，没有证据表明具有良好治理的高估值公司使用应计制的积极性较低。

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